UNITED
NATIONS

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Security Council

Distr.
GENERAL

S/24100
15 June 1992

ORIGINAL: ENGLISH

REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL PURSUANT TO PARAGRAPH 15 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 757 (1992) AND PARAGRAPH 10 OF SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 758 (1992)

INTRODUCTION

1. In paragraph 15 of resolution 757 (1992) the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it "on the implementation of resolution 752 (1992) by all parties and others concerned". In paragraph 10 of resolution 758 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General to report to it on his efforts to reopen Sarajevo airport in order to facilitate the unimpeded delivery of humanitarian supplies. The present report is submitted in fulfilment of the above requests of the Council, and supplements the Secretary-General's earlier reports submitted pursuant to paragraph 9 of resolution 752 (1992) (S/24000), and pursuant to paragraph 4 of the same resolution (S/24049). It contains information available to the Secretariat up to 0900 hours New York time on 15 June 1992.

I. POINTS ARISING FROM SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 752 (1992)

A. The cease-fire of 12 April 1992

2. In paragraph 1 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council demanded "that all parties and others concerned in Bosnia and Herzegovina stop the fighting immediately [and] respect immediately and fully the cease-fire signed on 12 April 1992".

3. This request of the Council was not at first heeded by the parties to the conflict. Numerous and repeated violations of the cease-fire continued to take place. Since the cease-fire of 12 April referred to in resolution 752 (1992), a new cease-fire was negotiated by the United Nations Protection Force in Yugoslavia (UNPROFOR) on 1 June, though this was itself violated within hours of its signing. It was subsequently reaffirmed in the agreement concluded in respect of Sarajevo airport on 5 June (S/24075, annex). That agreement, too, was not respected for several days. Indeed, as a result of the evacuation by the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) of the Marshal Tito

barracks in Sarajevo, whose blockading was described in S/24049, paragraph 6 (b), the Territorial Defence force of Bosnia and Herzegovina was reported to have acquired artillery, which it used to try to extend the territory under its control. The Bosnian Serb forces continued to use their own artillery to bombard the city of Sarajevo, which as a result suffered even more severe damage. On 11 June, one of the signatories to the airport agreement, Mr. Radovan Karadzic of the Bosnian Serb SDS party, announced a further "unilateral cease-fire" effective 15 June. In a letter to me on 13 June, President Izetbegovic denounced this as "an attempt to deceive the United Nations and world opinion". None the less, on 14 June both sides reaffirmed a new cease-fire as from 0600 hours local time on 15 June (see para. 30 below), which appears, at the time of writing, to be generally holding.

B. Efforts of the European Community

4. Also in paragraph 1 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council demanded "that all parties and others concerned ... cooperate with the efforts of the European Community to bring about urgently a negotiated political solution respecting the principle that any change of border by force is not acceptable". In paragraph 2, the Council urged "the three communities in Bosnia and Herzegovina to participate actively and constructively" in the European Community-sponsored discussions and "to conclude and implement the constitutional arrangements being developed at the tripartite talks".

5. The most recent session of the European Community-sponsored talks for future constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina was suspended on 27 May when representatives of the Muslim SDA Party withdrew from the talks in protest against the continuing shelling of Sarajevo by Bosnian Serb forces. Subsequent statements by the leaders of that party have reiterated their unwillingness to return to the negotiating table. On 8 June, President Izetbegovic of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina wrote to Lord Carrington, the Chairman of the European Community Conference on Yugoslavia, "to refuse the proposal to continue the talks in the present form" and expressed his inability to undertake further negotiations with representatives of the Serbian SDS Party. In reply, Lord Carrington urged him to participate fully in the negotiations and expressed the hope that President Izetbegovic would attend the next round of these discussions, which would be convened in the near future. Members of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina have, in conversations with UNPROFOR representatives, reaffirmed their view that they could resume participation in these talks only if the basis for discussions was changed. The leader of the Serbian SDS Party, Mr. Radovan Karadzic, has confirmed his party's willingness to participate in the talks and urged that they be reconvened immediately.

6. In my contacts with Lord Carrington, I have assured him of my continued support for his efforts towards an overall political settlement and of my conviction that the continuation and strengthening of the political process is a sine qua non for finding a way out of this tragic impasse and for arresting further bloodshed and destruction. I have noted that the impetus towards a

political settlement must be strengthened in order to prevent the conflict spreading in the region and making future reconciliation difficult for generations to come. In a statement on 12 June, Lord Carrington reiterated his intention to resume the talks on future constitutional arrangements in Bosnia and Herzegovina and said that he and Ambassador Cutileiro would proceed to Sarajevo for this purpose as soon as the airport is reopened.

C. External military interference

7. In paragraph 3 of resolution 752 (1992), the Council demanded that "all forms of interference from outside Bosnia and Herzegovina, including by units of the Yugoslav People's Army (JNA) as well as elements of the Croatian Army, cease immediately, and that Bosnia and Herzegovina's neighbours take swift action to end such interference". In paragraph 4, the Council demanded that units of the JNA and elements of the Croatian Army now in Bosnia and Herzegovina "must either be withdrawn, or be subject to the authority of the Government of Bosnia and Herzegovina, or be disbanded and disarmed with their weapons placed under effective international monitoring". In paragraph 5, the Council also demanded that "all irregular forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina be disbanded and disarmed".

8. I have reported fully on this subject in document S/24049. I regret to inform the Council that in the two weeks since that report was issued, there has been no appreciable change in the situation described therein. The authorities in both Belgrade and Zagreb categorically insist that they do not interfere militarily in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They further insist that armed Serbs and Croats there are citizens of that Republic who may have been members of the JNA and Croatian Army respectively but who are now demobilized from those armies and in no sense under the authority or control of Belgrade or Zagreb, as the case may be. At a meeting with me in Rio de Janeiro on 12 June, the Prime Minister of Croatia, Mr. Franjo Greguric, reaffirmed that Croatian Army units were deployed only on the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina and not on Bosnian territory and recalled a statement by President Izetbegovic to the effect that Croatian units in Bosnia and Herzegovina were fighting as part of, and under the command of, the Territorial Defence forces of that Republic.

9. It none the less remains a matter of great concern that demobilized elements of the armies of both sides should have been permitted to retain control over their tanks, armoured personnel carriers, artillery, personal weapons and uniforms. There is also reason to believe that both Serb and Croat combatants continue to receive at least part of their financial and logistic support from outside the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 10 June, UNPROFOR confirmed that an air attack involving cluster bombs was made on a hill outside Sarajevo controlled by forces of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

D. Expulsions

10. In paragraph 6 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council called upon "all parties and others concerned to ensure that forcible expulsions of persons from the areas where they live and any attempts to change the ethnic composition of the population, anywhere in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, cease immediately".

11. The practice of forced expulsions has continued in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The grim situation described in my earlier reports, particularly S/23900, paragraphs 5 and 6, persists.

12. Elsewhere in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, mass expulsions have also continued to occur. Following UNPROFOR's assumption of responsibility in Sector East, groups of Ruthenians and Croats were expelled from the villages of Miklusevci and Tovarnik on 19 and 23/24 May 1992. The second expulsion was intercepted by UNPROFOR, but the victims, who had been thoroughly intimidated, refused to go back to their villages and preferred to cross into Croatian-held territory. UNPROFOR has made representations, both written and oral, to the local authorities in Sector East as well as to the authorities in Belgrade and has submitted to both of them prosecution dossiers based on UNPROFOR's detailed investigation. UNPROFOR has called for the prosecution of 11 named individuals, including policemen, against whom a prima facie case has been established. The authorities concerned have given assurances that the prosecutions will be actively pursued. Following this episode, mass expulsions from Sector East appear to have ceased. But UNPROFOR has intensified its patrols in certain locations of special sensitivity, using police, military and civilian affairs personnel, and responds vigorously to any cases of intimidation that come to its attention.

13. A similar situation prevails in the Croatian-controlled parts of Sector West, where members of the Serbian minority are harassed by Croatian individuals and groups. Serbian houses continue to be burned and/or blown up in this Sector, in which UNPROFOR is yet to assume its full responsibilities. Evidence collected by United Nations civilian police has, in some instances, implicated the Croatian Army and police. UNPROFOR has protested to the authorities in Zagreb about the persistent violations of human rights in that part of Sector West which is under their control.

14. Both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Croatia minority families driven from their homes and farms are replaced, sometimes apparently with official assistance, by persons of other ethnic groups displaced from other regions. The purpose is to create areas overwhelmingly populated by a single ethnic group, a practice that has come to be known as "ethnic cleansing". UNPROFOR is doing all it can, within the limits of its mandate and resources, to prevent these inhumane practices and to respond vigorously when they occur. But what is required is energetic official action to end the excesses which are being carried out by ethnic chauvinists of all communities. Meanwhile, the implementation of paragraph 6 of resolution 752 (1992) remains elusive.

E. Humanitarian assistance

15. In paragraph 7 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council emphasized the urgent need for humanitarian assistance and fully supported efforts to deliver humanitarian aid to the victims of the conflict. In paragraph 8, it called on "all parties and others concerned to ensure that conditions are established for the effective and unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, including safe and secure access to airports in Bosnia and Herzegovina". In paragraph 9, the Council requested the Secretary-General "to keep under active review the feasibility of protecting international humanitarian relief programmes".

16. Since June 1991, some 1.5 million people have been forced to flee their homes in the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, and the numbers continue to rise. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) estimates that over 750,000 people have been displaced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, many of whom have crossed into neighbouring republics which are already offering refuge to more than 500,000 persons displaced from the war in Croatia. None of the republics of the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia has been unaffected by the humanitarian crisis. The number of victims of the conflict continues to grow while the ability of the host communities to look after them steadily declines.

17. As I made clear in my report in S/24000, the delivery of humanitarian assistance to an increasingly deprived population in Bosnia and Herzegovina has been gravely complicated by the persistence of fighting. On 24 May UNHCR was compelled to suspend deliveries of humanitarian relief supplies within Bosnia and Herzegovina after it became clear that security guarantees negotiated with political and military leaders were not respected by local gunmen manning a profusion of roadblocks. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), in turn, suspended its relief operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina following the killing of one of its delegates on 18 May 1992. Negotiations to achieve more adequate security guarantees were continued with all parties to the conflict and culminated in a new agreement signed under the auspices of ICRC in Geneva on 6 June. Following this agreement, ICRC and UNHCR have indicated their intention to resume operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina shortly.

18. The question of the reopening of Sarajevo airport to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian supplies is treated in paragraphs 27 to 31 below.

F. Possible peace-keeping mission

19. In paragraph 10 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council asked the Secretary-General "to continue to keep under review the possibility of deploying a peace-keeping mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina".

20. In the light of the evolving situation and given that UNPROFOR had become the only international entity still present in Sarajevo, I recommended to the

Security Council in my last report (S/24075) the enlargement of UNPROFOR's mandate and an increase in its strength to facilitate the reopening of Sarajevo airport for humanitarian and related purposes. The Council approved this recommendation in its resolution 758 (1992). A progress report on the first phase of this mission is provided in paragraphs 27 to 31 below.

G. Cooperation with UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitor Mission

21. In paragraph 11 of resolution 752 (1992), the Council demanded "that all parties and others concerned cooperate fully with UNPROFOR and the European Community Monitor Mission, and respect fully their freedom of movement and the safety of their personnel". I regret to report that the response to this demand has been extremely limited.

22. The European Community Monitor Mission withdrew from Bosnia and Herzegovina on 6 May following the killing of one of its monitors. UNPROFOR temporarily withdrew the bulk of its headquarters personnel from Sarajevo on 16 and 17 May, while leaving behind a headquarters group of 106 persons headed by the Chief Military Observer, Colonel John Wilson. Their tasks are described in S/24000, paragraph 10. The work of Colonel Wilson and his team has been considerably handicapped by repeated interference with its freedom of movement, including many incidents in which UNPROFOR vehicles were fired upon. In fact, all UNPROFOR movement in Sarajevo now has to take place in armoured personnel carriers. The Force Commander of UNPROFOR estimates that he has been fortunate not to have suffered casualties, given all parties' disregard for the safety of UNPROFOR personnel. Agreements arrived at after intensive liaison with the parties, guaranteeing safe passage to UNPROFOR vehicles on specific routes at agreed times, have routinely been violated. Such violations are invariably ascribed by each party to the other side or to persons unknown.

H. UNPROFOR in the United Nations Protected Areas

23. In paragraph 12 of resolution 752 (1992), the Security Council requested the Secretary-General "to ensure that UNPROFOR will assume its full responsibilities in all the United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) as soon as possible", following its assumption of responsibility in Sector East on 15 May.

24. Although some progress is being made to this end, difficulties persist. In Sector East, Territorial Defence units refuse to withdraw heavy equipment, including tanks and mortars, from the UNPA; efforts continue in order to remove these obstacles, as also to commence the demilitarization process in this sector. In Sector West, some delay in UNPROFOR's assumption of responsibility has occurred as a result of difficulties relating to the exact definition of the boundaries and the necessity for readjustment of battalion responsibilities to release one battalion for possible tasks at Sarajevo airport. In Sectors North and South, problems continue in relation to the

so-called "pink zones". These are largely Serb-populated areas between the proposed UNPA boundaries and the present lines of confrontation, whose inhabitants are unwilling to accept the restoration of Croatian activity and want to be incorporated within the UNPAs. The Force Commander reports that efforts continue to be made on these issues and that it is his hope that UNPROFOR will have assumed its full responsibilities in all the UNPAs by the end of June.

25. UNPROFOR difficulties in Sectors North and South have recently been exacerbated by developments in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Their economic situation is deteriorating rapidly because of blockades and the closing of established lines of supply from Serbia through the northern parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina as a result of the fighting in that Republic. Shortages of power, food and medical supplies are now widespread. In addition, the fighting in Bosnia and Herzegovina creates tension in the UNPAs and sometimes spills over into them. Moreover, refugees from that fighting have imposed additional demands upon already scarce resources in these sectors.

I. Disarming of irregulars

26. In paragraph 13 of resolution 752 (1992), the Council urged full compliance with the United Nations peace- keeping plan, "in particular the disarming of all irregular forces ... in the UNPAs". Progress in this matter has been slow. Many of the irregular forces appear to have been absorbed into the local territorial defence militias, and in some cases the local police, in the UNPAs. The whole problem of the disarming and demobilisation of the irregular and territorial forces has been complicated by the decision of the JNA to deliver much of its weapons, including heavy weapons, to those forces before withdrawing from the UNPAs. Talks on these issues are proceeding in Sector East, where UNPROFOR has assumed responsibility; little progress has been made so far in the other sectors.

II. REOPENING OF SARAJEVO AIRPORT

27. Following the adoption of Security Council resolution 758 (1992) on 8 June 1992, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR, General Nambiar, decided to dispatch on 10 June his Chief of Staff, Brigadier-General Lewis MacKenzie, to Sarajevo as Commander-designate of UNPROFOR's new Sarajevo sector. General MacKenzie was accompanied by an advance party including some United Nations military observers and reconnaissance elements drawn from the Canadian infantry battalion, which is currently deployed in Sector West and which the Force Commander intends in due course to transfer temporarily to Sarajevo pending the arrival in theatre of the additional infantry elements approved by Security Council resolution 758 (1992).

28. General MacKenzie set out in a convoy from Belgrade early on 11 June and reached the former JNA base at Lukavica, outside Sarajevo, without incident. However, two UNPROFOR escort vehicles from Sarajevo that went out to meet him

and bring him to UNPROFOR headquarters were turned back by small arms fire as well as mines and barriers laid across the road. The two UNPROFOR vehicles were struck by several dozen rounds and a soldier was slightly injured. General MacKenzie was therefore obliged to remain at Lukavica overnight and arrived at UNPROFOR headquarters in Sarajevo only at 1600 hours on 11 June, 34 hours after his convoy had set out. His attempts the following day to return to Lukavica for discussions with General Ratko Mladic, Commander of the Bosnian Serb forces, were similarly thwarted.

29. General MacKenzie was joined on 12 June by an airport security team of 50 persons, including 10 officers, provided by the Government of France. A further 60 military observers drawn equally from two existing peace-keeping operations, the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and the United Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM), are being moved to Sarajevo on 16 June. The task of General MacKenzie's advance party is to establish the cease-fire, start evaluating conditions at the airport and verify the withdrawal of anti-aircraft and heavy weaponry as provided for in the agreement of 5 June (S/24075, annex). For the first three days of their mission, it proved impossible for them to reach Sarajevo airport. This was partly because of widespread fighting in the areas they had to cross en route to the airport but also because they came under fire from Bosnian Serb elements who appeared not to accept the agreement of 5 June and were seemingly not prepared to allow the airport to be placed under United Nations control.

30. On 14 June, however, General MacKenzie was able to achieve three of his immediate objectives. First, he obtained separate reaffirmations of the cease-fire from representatives of the Presidency of Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as of the Bosnian Serb side; the resulting cease-fire came into effect at 0600 hours local time on 15 June, and at least initially appears to be holding. Secondly, with the cooperation of the Bosnian Serb side and under their escort, he was able to despatch a 30-man reconnaissance team to the airport; details of their findings appear in paragraph 31 below. Thirdly, he made significant progress in discussions on the withdrawal of heavy weapons from within range of Sarajevo airport. A definitive agreement on this question with military leaders on the Bosnian Serb side was expected to be signed shortly. Although these developments are encouraging, difficulties persist in relation to safe access from UNPROFOR headquarters to the airport, the preferred route being one that traverses a heavily contested area, control of which has frequently changed hands in the course of the recent conflict. The establishment of an effective and lasting cease-fire is clearly required for the resolution of this problem.

31. With regard to the initial reconnaissance of the airport on 14 June, the Force Commander of UNPROFOR reports that the installations appear to be in better condition than had been feared. In particular, the buildings do not appear to have suffered extensive damage and the runways, taxiways and parking aprons appear on first sight to be in usable condition. The lack of electricity at the airport made it impossible to verify if the equipment in the control tower and its approach beacons are functioning. Some of the airport's heavy equipment has been damaged and there are no fire trucks or fuel tankers; in any event, the Force Commander recommends that, as a

practical matter, aircraft flying into Sarajevo not attempt to refuel there. Despite this encouraging report, it is clear that considerable work still needs to be done to get the airport functioning again.

III. OBSERVATIONS

32. It will be apparent from the preceding paragraphs that there is only limited progress to report as regards implementation of the international community's efforts to control and resolve the dreadful conflict in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I nevertheless believe that the international community should remain firm in its determination to put into effect the mechanisms and procedures which it has already established to relieve the human suffering, to bring the fighting under control and to negotiate a just and lasting political settlement of the conflict. What is lacking at present is willingness on the part of the opposing sides in Bosnia and Herzegovina to honour agreements which they sign and to use the mechanisms which the international community has put into place at great cost and risk to the lives of international personnel. Although the developments of 14 and 15 June offer encouragement in this respect, I am keenly aware of how often in the past similar hopes have been dashed.

33. The picture in Croatia is less sombre as UNPROFOR moves towards assumption of its full responsibilities in all four sectors of the UNPAs, though daily breaches of the cease-fire and violations of human rights still occur there, as well as instances of non-cooperation with UNPROFOR. But, in assessing the prospects in Bosnia and Herzegovina, it is important to remember that there was a time when the situation in Croatia also seemed hopeless. Yet the international community's perseverance in peacemaking and peace-keeping did in the end bring about conditions which, though far from perfect, have permitted the deployment of a large United Nations peace-keeping force.

34. For its part, the United Nations will continue to do all it can to implement both UNPROFOR's original mandate in Croatia and the new one entrusted to it in Bosnia and Herzegovina. These efforts by the United Nations are intended to create the conditions in which effective international action can be taken to ease the suffering of the civilian population and in which the negotiation of political solutions can proceed under the auspices of the European Community. It is political negotiation which offers the only real hope of restoring peace in what were the constituent republics of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. I therefore join my voice to Lord Carrington's in appealing to all concerned to return to the negotiating tables over which he and Ambassador Cutileiro preside. The Security Council may again wish to reaffirm its unqualified support for their efforts.

35. I also urge the international community to respond generously to the appeals for humanitarian support made by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and to respond to the problems of all refugees and displaced persons from the former Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, wherever they may be and to whichever community they may belong.